JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TARGETING
AN ALTERNATE SCHEME

BY

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Joint Special Operations Targeting
An Alternate Scheme

An Individual Study Project

by

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

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ABSTRACT

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Special Operations Forces (SOF) represent a significant combat multiplier for the theater commander throughout the spectrum of conflict. The Department of Defense's committment to enhance our Special Operations capability has been domonstrated in the past three years with the establishment of Special Operations Commands (SOC) in the regional unified command headquarters, and in the recent development of doctrine for the targeting (war time tactical employment) of Special Operations Forces units. (This study focuses on the Targeting of Special Forces Operational Detachments and SEAL Teams) The study examines the proposed Joint SO targeting doctrine, and the theater target board process on which it is based. It identifies significant problems with using the Theater Target Board process as a foundation for Special Operations targeting and proposes an alternative targeting scheme.

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AN ALTERNATIVE SCHEME

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Special Operations (SO) has made great strides in our military forces during the past two years. This is due to the efforts of not only the Special Operations community, but also unified command headquarters, who have started to seriously integrate Special Operations Forces (SOF) into the theater war plans. However, after reviewing the draft Joint Special Operations Targeting Procedures[1] and the supporting draft of the Special Forces Operations Field Manual[2], I am convinced that the current approach to SO targeting is fatally flawed. We are attempting to impose a single existing targeting system on five markedly different SOF units, and are imposing that targeting system in spite of significant operational differences that require different approaches to targeting.

BACKGROUND

The draft Joint Special Operations Targeting Procedures are based on the Theater Target Board Procedures; a system which has been used by our unified headquarters for many years. The purpose of the Theater Target Board is to

ensure the effective employment of theater level deep surveillance, attack, and support resources". From this definition it can be seen that the primary role for the Target Board is in coordination of the Theater Deep Battle, during the execution of a campaign or major operation.

However a significant problem arises with the direction of Special Operations by the Theater Target Board because of the wide variety SOF missions. (see Figure 1, below)

SOF Missions



Ranger Battalion	-	-	-	X	-	-
Special Forces Operational Det	X	X	X	X	X	-
SEAL Team	X	-	X	X	X	-
Para Rescue	-	-	-	-	-	X

Figure 1

Note: "X" indicates that the unit is assigned that mission.

The crux of the problem is that the majority of these SOF missions are not controlled by the Theater Target Board. Foreign Internal Defense (FID) is

conducted under the control the US Country Team (US Embassy) in the host country.[4] In Unconventional Warfare (UW) the primary component is the mobilization of indigenous forces to support our national goals. An unconventional warfare effort is a major, long term undertaking, which requires more than just a unified headquarters decision to execute. The important question that must be answered at our National Command Authority (NCA) level is, does the US have the policy and the will to liberate the homeland of the indigenous population? Since the Second World War our credibility in supporting indigenous forces has not been good. We abandoned a significant number of partisan forces at the end of the Korean War, the indigenous tribes that supported us in the Viet Nam War, and it appears we are about to do the same in Central America. Clearly the decision to develop or support a UW effort will not be made unilaterally by a Theater Target Board. However, if there is already a UW effort in progress, it is logical that the indigenous forces they control would receive their mission taskings based on the priorities of the Theater Target Board. Counterterrorism Operations will normally be controlled at the national level[5], and if control is passed the the theater, it will be exercised by a Crisis Action Team in the Theater Headquarters[6]. The US Air Force Para Rescue units have been assigned to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), but they have a very narrow mission focus. Although the recovery of pilots downed behind enemy lines is critical from the Air Force perspective, the tasking of those missions will be handled within US Air Force Channels. Thus only Deep Reconnaissance and Direct Action Operations conducted by Ranger Battalions, Special Forces Detachments and SEAL Teams are the SOF missions that will be controlled by the Theater Target Board. Even at that depth of employment will also play a role in limiting the Theater Target Board's authority. The Ranger Battalions can be used in a variety of different missions, but generally they will be quick

missions lasting no more the 72 hours, and limited in depth of employment by fire support and helicopter range. (Figure 2) Therefore the targeting of Ranger Battalion Operations will primarily concern the Corps headquarters.

Depth of Employment



Figure 2

Based on the constraints of SOF Missions and Depth of Employment, presented above, it becomes apparent that the Joint Special Operations Targeting Proceedures are relevant to Special Forces Operational Detachments and SEAL Teams conducting Deep Reconnaissance and Direct Action Missions. The focus of the remainder of this paper will be to examine the suitability of the proposed Joint Special Operations Targeting Procedures from that limited perspective.

At first glance the Joint Special Operations Targeting Procedures have many strong points, and seem appropriate to the task. (an overview of these procedures is found on pages 4a ,4b) Special Operations Forces are integrated

Special Forces Theater Targeting

Extracted from Chapter 8, FM 31-20, Coordinating Draft, August 88



Figure 3

Overview of the Special Forces Theater Targeting Process[7]

The J2/J3 Theater Target Board ensures the effective employment of theater level deep surveillance, attack, and support resources. The board: (the paragraph numbers below, are keyed to Figure 1, page 2a)

1. Establishes targeting objectives and priorities based on the CINC's guidance.

2. Receives, consolidates, deconflicts, and prioritizes target nominations from subordinate force commanders, to include the Special Operations Command (SOC) Commander.

3. Tasks the appropriate SOF Unit to assess, plan, and or execute the mission. When a target, a target set or an objective area is nominated for attack by a SOF unit, the target board forwards the nomination in a MISSION TASKING PACKET (MTP) to the SOC target panel.

4. SOC Targeting Panel:
a. Forwards the MTP to the appropriate SOF unit (on Figure 1, it is a Special Forces Group) to perform a PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT (PA). The PA determines if the tasking is a valid SOF target and if the tasked SOF unit can execute the mission with an acceptable degree of risk.
b. Forward the MTP to the appropriate intelligence agency. (on Figure 1, it is the TASOC ISE) The intelligence agency provides the tasked SOF unit with any additional intelligencerequired to perform the PA.

5&6. The tasked SOF unit forwards the completed PA through the SOC target panel to the theater target board.

7. If the theater target board approves the PA, the board directs the SOC to prepare a SPECIAL OPERATIONS MISSION PLANNING FOLDER (SOMPF) for the target.

8. The SOC tasks:
a. The appropriate SOF unit (in this case the Special Forces Group) to preparea PLAN OF EXECUTION (POE).
b. The appropriate intelligence agency (in this case the TASOC ISE) to produce a SPECIAL OPERATIONS INTELLIGENCE FOLDER (SOIF) that supports the POE

9. The intelligence agency forwards the completed SOIF to the SOC Target Panel.

10. The SOF unit forwards the completed POE to the SOC Target Panel.

11. The SOC Target Panel assembles an SOMPF for each target and forwards the SOMPF to the SOC Commander for approval. A Complete SOMPF has three parts: Part I Mission Tasking Packet, Part II Special Operations Intelligence Folder Part III Plan of Execution Once the SOC commander approves and prioritizes the SOMPF it is forwarded to the SOF unit and becomes the basis for deliberate SOF mission planning.

All Acronyms listed in Glossary

with other US Military Forces assigned theater deep battle missions, and are employed at the Operational Level, with direct guidance from the Theater CINC and his staff. An additional advantage is that planning is conducted in phases, which allows the SOF chain of command to evaluate target feasibility, before a great investment in planning time and effort is made. Furthermore, similar targeting procedures have worked successfully for four decades with US Air Force Aircraft, so the logical question is, why won't the same system suffice for Special Operating Forces? The answer lies in how the Theater Target Board fulfills its responsibilities in Deliberate Planning, and in the Execution of a Theater Campaign Plan, which we will examine in the next chapter.

End Notes

1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS PUB 3-05.5, Joint Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning Procedures, draft Copy, Washington D.C., undated. Hereafter referred to simply as JCS PUB 3-05.5.

2. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 31-20, Special Forces Operations, Coordinating draft, Fort Bragg, 30 August 88. Hereafter referred to simply as FM 31-20.

3. FM 31-20. Page 8-1

4. U.S. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-20, Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict, Final draft, Washington DC, 24 June 88, Page 2-33. Hereafter referred to simply as FM 100-20.

5. FM 100-20. Page 3-14

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS PUB 5-02.4, Joint Operations Planning System, Volume IV (Crisis Action Procedures), Washington D.C., 8 July 88 Hereafter referred to simply as JCS PUB 5-02.4

7. FM 31-20, Chapter 8

CHAPTER II

THE THEATER TARGET BOARD

The purpose of the Theater Target Board is to "ensure the effective employment of theater level deep surveillance, attack, and support resources"[1]. Yet like all command and control elements the Theater Target Board's ability to achieve its purpose is limited by organizational constraints and the resources at their disposal. From June 1986 until June 1988 I supported two theater headquarters, PACIFIC COMMAND (PACOM) and UNITED NATIONS COMMAND (UNC) (located in Korea) as a Special Forces Battalion Commander. As a result I had the opportunity to observe some of the everyday problems confronting the Theater Target Board in the Deliberate Planning Process. The most significant organizational constraint that the Theater Target Board and the intelligence community confronted was the lack of definitive Theater Campaign Plans, Concept Plans or even operational employment concepts. Our current Joint Planning System (JOPS) focuses on getting forces into the theater, but provides very little guidance for the actual operational employment of those forces. Therefore, the Theater Target Boards tend to identify "targets" as quickly as they can collect the overhead photography. They work under the unwritten philosophy that the larger their data base of "targets", the more likely it is that they will have the required information on the "critical targets", once someone in J-3 decides on a definition of "critical targets". This situation produces a glut of "targets". These are, without exception, large enemy fixed installations, which have no obvious relationship

to any operational concept. As soon as they are identified the Theater Target Board assigns these "Targets" to a component for execution planning. The targeting process is continuous; so, over time literally hundreds of targets are identified and assigned to components for execution planning. The way the game is played within the Joint Targeting Community, the most important measure of a component effectiveness in this planning process is the sheer number of "Targets" they have planned for execution. As we will see in the next Chapter, due to the more detailed intelligence requirements for SO targets, it is counter productive to compete in terms of numbers of targets.

The Theater Target Board's execution of a Campaign Plan also presents a significant problem to SO targeting. From April 1983 until March 1984 I served as a action officer in the J-3 of US Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and, incidentally, as a member of that Theater Targeting Board. SOUTHCOM was executing a significant aerial reconnaissance campaign over El Salvador and Honduras at that time, and the Targeting Board met on a daily basis to review the program of planned flights. We had developed a long range reconnaissance plan, (30 days) to allow supporting aerial reconnaissance units to program required aircraft maintenance and aircrew training. However, the situation often dictated last minute mission changes, which required a significant effort on the part of the aerial reconnaissance units to fulfill. The important point is that the Targeting Board's mission cycle, from target identification to mission accomplishment, was often less than twenty-four hours. The effectiveness of the Theater Targeting Board was measured not only in intelligence collected, but also in responsiveness to new targets. As we will see in the next Chapter, SO Forces are significantly less responsive to changes in targeting than other forces that are controlled by the Theater

Targeting Board.

From these experiences in working with Theater Target Boards, I am convinced that they have unintentionally but quite logically evolved to fit the capability of the assets that they most often program, high performance reconnaissance and strike aircraft. Furthermore, the current system provides modern aircraft all the intelligence they need to conduct their missions, and the fact that these targets are often not related to an overall theater operational concept is unimportant. Modern combat aircraft ability to quickly retarget means that the Operational Concept that will drive their employment in the Theater Campaign Plan will evolve as the situation develops. The Theater Target Board as currently organized is very attractive to our military institution because it is perfectly synchronized with Air Land Battle doctrine. This compatibility gives the theater CINC a tremendous operational flexibility and matches the employment of modern combat aircraft systems to their capabilities. But the operational capabilities of SOF elements are strikingly different, and require a different concept of targeting.

End Notes

1. FM 31-20, Page 8-1

CHAPTER III

DIFFERENCES THAT AFFECT TARGETING

The oversight of the Deep Battle requires that the Theater Target Board control the targeting of two completely different operational systems: SOF and modern military aircraft. Although the differences between the two seem obvious, close examination of their operational capabilities reveal fundamental implications for not only the execution but also the deliberate planning of the theater's campaign.

In the execution of a campaign plan the most striking differences between SOF units and Strike Aircraft, are in their delivery of combat power, the response time of each system, and their relative levels of vulnerability. (Figure 4, Page 9a) Compared to SOF elements, Strike Aircraft are much more powerful and much less vulnerable. Strike Aircraft have enormous combat power in the form of the wide variety and large volume of munitions that they can deliver on the enemy. Although tactical surprise is still important, Strike Aircraft generally have enough combat power (firepower and mobility) to allow "forceable entry" into their target area. Strike Aircraft are vulnerable only to a small portion of the enemy's strength, his anti-aircraft systems, and will spend a relatively short period of time over enemy territory. Furthermore, the central purpose of air mission planning is to reduce the aircraft's exposure time to the enemy's anti-aircraft weapons systems.

Strike Aircraft offer an impressive advantage in terms of retargeting. The

Operational Differences that affect Targeting





	SOF Element	Strike Aircraft
Combat Power	Normally inferior to the Target-depends primarily on tactical surprise	Sufficient to allow "Forceable Entry"
Ordnance on Target	20-100 lbs of High Explosive Circular Error Probable - 0	5000-10,000 lbs of HE CEP - 30 meters
Battle Field Mobility	Measured in Kilometers per day	Measured in hundreds of Kilometers per hour
Retargeting Response	Measured in Days and Weeks	Measured in hours and minutes
Vulnerabilities	The majority of enemy weapons systems, local populace, dogs, disease and sustainment	Limited to enemy Anti-Aircraft Systems and Enemy Air Threat
Exposure to enemy counter-action	Extended periods	Short, repeated exposures

Figure 4

high level of aviation technology, combined with the Theater Target Data Base developed during the deliberate planning phase allows for very rapid mission planning, even permitting aircraft to be diverted from preplanned strikes to attack other higher priority targets. The entire mission cycle, from the Air Frag Order until ordnance on target can be measured in hours.

By contrast, SOF potential destructive capability and mission effectiveness rely primarily on tactical surprise. A SOF unit's combat power is minuscule when compared to most of the enemy's military organizations, which means that forceable entry will rarely be a feasible option. Additionally, the SFOD is vulnerable to the majority of the enemy's weapons systems, and will be within range of many of those weapons systems for extended periods of time.

In comparison to Strike Aircraft, SOF are not responsive to retargeting. Their HF burst communications system uses a scheduled net that allows for only one or two transmissions a day. (This communications system is required for transmission security and the necessary range.) The SOF messages are encrypted and decrypted using a very secure but time consuming system. Additionally due to their absolute need for tactical surprise the SOF must carefully approach their targets on foot, conduct their reconnaissance to locate and to identify their method of entry into the target, and wait for the opportune moment to attack. The SOF depends on difficult terrain, inhospitable weather and the enemy's insufficient ground security deep within his communications zone to provide the tactical opportunity to successfully execute their attack. The cumulative effect of the limited radio contacts distance to be traveled to the target (usually on foot) , and the absolute necessity for tactical surprise means that the entire mission cycle, from the Frag Order until ordnance on target must be measured in days and often weeks.

means that the entire mission cycle, from the Frag Order until ordnance on target must be measured in days and often weeks.

In the deliberate planning phase of a campaign plan the most striking difference between SOF units and Strike Aircraft, is the much more detailed intelligence for any given target. (Figure 5, page 11a) This fact is obvious from the operational differences, cited above, and particularly the total dependence on tactical surprise.

"Attrition" versus "Relational Maneuver"

From the operational differences described above it is obvious that we are dealing with two radically different operational systems for implementing the Theater CINC's deep battle. More importantly these two operational systems represent fundamentally opposed approaches to the mission that they share. This difference in approach has been recognized and described by Mr. Edward Luttwak in the comparison of armed forces with an "Attrition" approach versus those with a "Relational Maneuver" approach to warfare.[1] He explains very clearly that all armed forces combine elements of each approach, and therefore the two approaches must be considered as ideal types, marking the opposite ends of a continuum. Either approach can be correct, according to the nature of the armed forces to be employed, however each approach has a unique impact on the operational methods, tactics and structure of armed forces.

The Attrition approach is appropriate for armed forces controlling superior material resources. This is true because victory is gained by the most efficient administration of the organization's resources, which results in overwhelming combat power that will grind out a victory. The terrain is important only in the

Intelligence Requirements





	SOF ELEMENT	Strike Aircraft
Infiltration Phase	Target Location (Coordinates) and composition Topography, ground cover enroute to target Local inhabitants/customs/language Enemy Air Defenses and Air Order of Battle (Primary responsibility of the Infiltration Air Crew, but SOF needs it for contingency planning)	Target Location (Coordinates) and composition Topography enroute to target Cleared flight corridors Aerial Refueling/Escorts Enemy Air Defenses and Air Order of Battle enroute to and in the vicinity of the target
Actions at the Objective Phase	Ordnance/ equipment necessary to destroy the target Detailed topography/ vegetation of the target area (30 Km radius) Concealed route from Drop Zone into the immediate vicinity of the Target (≤5 km from target) Likely configuration of the Target on the ground Possible Local Partisan Contacts Probable location of the enemy security forces Concealed route into and out of the actual Target Critical components of the target (for Demo attack) Standoff Attack methods Hide Site to evade enemy searches for an extended period	Ordnance necessary to destroy the target Target Recognition (i.e. Beacon Bombing / Terminal Designation)

Figure 5

obstacles that it presents to efficient [redacted]ation, and the enemy is merely a series of targets that must be identified and engaged. Therefore, a force that utilizes the Attrition approach need not be sensitive to the external environment; logically, its focus must be on internal efficiency and best use of its superior resources.

The Relational-Maneuver approach is appropriate for armed forces that do not control superior resources. Victory must be achieved by identifying a tactical opportunity and then reconfiguring your own forces to take advantage of that weakness. The terrain, the weather, the enemy forces or a combination of any of these can provide the necessary tactical opportunity. Therefore, the success of a force that utilizes the Relational-Maneuver approach is directly related to its sensitivity to the external environment, and in its ability to react.

Although Mr. Luttwak was comparing armed forces at a national level, the parallel between, the Attrition / Relational Maneuver approaches and Modern Military Aircraft / SOF is striking. The great technological sophistication of modern aircraft, their high cost, and relative scarcity logically require a focus on their efficient employment. Their targeting necessitates, and the Theater Target Board provides, an Attrition approach perspective. The most significant problem in targeting of Strike Aircraft is locating the target, or selection of the proper mix of targets from a long target list. Once the Strike Aircraft arrives in the target area we can be confident that the target will be destroyed. However the relative vulnerability and limited combat power of SOF elements require a Relational Maneuver perspective for targeting. The most significant problem in SOF targeting is not target location, but the identification of a weakness that will allow an effective attack. Arriving in the target area is only a small part of the mission. The intellectual framework that Mr. Luttwak provides suggests that our efforts to directly integrate SO Targeting into the existing Joint Targeting Process has been

is not target location, but the identification of a weakness that will allow an effective attack. Arriving in the target area is only a small part of the mission. The intellectual framework that Mr. Luttwak provides suggests that our efforts to directly integrate SO Targeting into the existing Joint Targeting Process has been inappropriate. Two operational systems with such fundamentaily different approaches to their missions require a fundamentally different approach to targeting.

This theoretical distinction in targeting approachs has had a significant impact on the current SOF targeting. By allowing the impetus of the Joint Targeting System to focus SOF on the existing data base of fixed installation targets we have committed ourselves to an impossible planning task for targets that we will never attack. It is an impossible planning task because of the large, and ever increasing, number of targets , which is compounded by the amount of additional detail (see Figure 3, page 6a) required in planning a SOF mission. Furthermore, under the current SO targeting system the lion's share of the work must be completed by the theater level Special Operations Command, and "This planning will normally take place during peacetime, when the SOCs are manned at minimum level."[2] (See Figure 6, next page.) We will in all likelihood never attack these targets because a SOF element cannot carry enough demolitions to destroy most of the fixed installations that are on the current target lists. Additionally, from the theater's perspective, SOF units cannot approach the responsiveness of Strike Aircraft. We require more time to plan, and time on the ground to approach the target and to conduct surveillance to identify the 'hole in the wire" that we will use to enter the target on the ground.

The end results of the draft SO Targeting Proceedures are already felt in deliberate planning process and would be debilitating during the execution of a

campaign plan. During deliberate planning SOCs spend the majority of their time and effort enveloped in the snowstorm of minutiae that result from the detailed intelligence requirements of a long list of fixed targets. The capabilities of Special Forces Group, Battalions and SEAL Team Staffs are largely untapped since they only "refine" the targets identified by the Theater Target Board. (Figure 6, page 14a) The most critical aspect of SOF mission planning is identifying the vulnerability of the enemy to attack, and by designating the targets geographically, the current targeting process effectively removes the SOF chains of command from the most critical aspect of the deliberate planning process. In the execution of a Theater Campaign Plan we can expect that the Theater Target Board will consistantly task SOF units with targets that exceed our operational capability and that require execution before we can even infiltrate an element into the operational area.

End Notes

1. Luttwak, Edward N. "Notes on Low-Intensity Warfare." Parameters, Vol 13, December 1983, pages 11-18

2. JCS PUB 3-05.5 Paragraph 5.9d

3. FM 31-20, Page 8-8

Special Forces Deliberate Mission Planning Process [3]

Organization	Responsibilities	Staff Assigned	Targets
SOC Special Operations Command	Identify and prioritize targets (with the Theater Target Board) Develop initial mission statement and mission concept (MICON) Assign mission to SFOB and provide Mission Tasking Packet (MTP) Select Operational areas Identify sensitivity and oversight requirements	8	100
SFG Special Forces Group	Receive conceptual MTP Refine mission statement / MICON Assign mission to Battalion	30	50
SF Bn Special Forces Battalion	Recieve refined MTP Futher refine mission statement / MICON as required Develop detailed list of specific operational requirements (SOR) Determine intelligence requirements and submit through SFOB to TASOC ISE Prepare initial Plan of Execution (POE) Assign mission to SFOD Secure approval for final POE from the SFOB	15	17
SFOD Special Forces Operational Detachment	Develop and finalize POE	4	1

Note: The information in the Organization and Responsibilities coumns is directly extracted from Figure 8-2, FM 31-20. The numbers in the Staff Assigned Column represent the Operations and Intelligence Staff at each echelon, based on the author's estimates. The numbers in the Target column are an example of how the SO Targets would break out against each echelon in a theater that has two Special Forces Groups assigned, and demonstrate that the although the SOC is heavily committed the remaining echelons of SOF commanders and staff are underemployed.

Figure 6

CHAPTER IV

AN ALTERNATIVE TARGETING SCHEME

Rather than competing in the current Joint Targeting System for a class of targets (large fixed installations) which we are not well suited to attack, we should focus on finding another targeting concept that will use SOF's capabilities to complement our air power in the thester deep battle. We must start that analysis by approaching the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) from a different angle than the current Joint Targeting Process.

The Joint Targeting Process approaches the problem from the perspective of what can be "seen". The process designates "targets", at specific geographic locations, based on what is revealed by overhead reconnaissance. This approach focuses on enemy forces that are visible to intelligence analysts.

Of course, one of the most difficult problems in modern war is that most of the enemy forces are not visible. Modern weapon lethality means that, if you can be seen, you can be hit; and if you can be hit, you will be killed. As a result of this all modern military forces have been required to disperse their forces to avoid destruction. Furthermore, many of these forces are mobile and move constantly to improve their survivability. This dispersion and mechanization on the modern battle field means that it is very nearly impossible to identify a single "critical node" that will have a significant impact on the enemy at the theater level. Therefore it is imperative to develop a Special Operations

Targeting Strategy that addresses multiple elements of a target system, since only the cumulative effect of multiple attacks can achieve significant results at theater level. Additionally SF should focus on the mobile elements of the enemy systems that are not as "visible" to overhead surveillance.

Thus Special Operations Theater Targeting requires a different application of the "CARVER" acronym, (see Figure 7 on following page) than has been traditionally used by our Operational Detachments in their individual target analysis. In order to focus the potential combat power of SOF to support Theater Campaign plans the SOC and SOF units must take a broader view and analyze enemy operating systems, such as Soviet Naval Aviation, rail transportation, petroleum distribution and electric grids. Since the focus of the effort will be on the mobile elements of the enemy operating systems, and the limited battle field mobility of the SOF elements will not allow them to pursue the mobile targets, it is important that SOF elements be inserted into the general area where the enemy will deploy his systems. The Theater Target Board can approach their task with the mindset of a "hunter" while employing modern high performance aircraft. As soon as the target is spotted, the operating system has the mobility and combat power to engage and destroy it. But the SOF elements have neither the mobility nor the combat power of modern high performance aircraft. Therefore the SOC must approach his task with the mindset of a "trapper". He must understand his quarry, its doctrine, its habits; and the impact that the terrain and climate will have, in order to know where to put out his network of traps, to have the greatest possibility of success.

CARVER SOF Target Analysis Factors
Criticality to enemy operations Accessability to SOF element Recouperability-how long to repair, replace, bypass Vulnerability to SOF weapons and tactics Effect at Strategic, Operational and Tactical Levels also must consider effect on local populace Recognizability-must be able to identify target under various weather, light and seasonal conditions

Figure 7

The intelligence community has started to develop the procedural perspective, the operational level Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), that is necessary to support this "trapper" approach to targeting.[1] This IPB considers a wide variety of factors, including the theater's topography, climate, and existing transportation and communication networks. "Using these tools and without getting bogged down in detail, an effective operational level analysis must take a broad 'stand-back' approach to obtain a strategic appreciation and understanding of . . . the theater characteristics that will influence the conduct of campaigns."[2] The intelligence templating techniques used identify the general war time locations of enemy military units and logistical bases. Using this Operational Level IPB as the foundation, the SOC can approach SO targeting from a systems perspective, rather than the individual, target by target perspective of the Theater Target Board.

An important decision is which enemy operating systems will be analyzed and in which sequence. The best basis for this decision is the Commander's Intent, and the enemy centers of gravity as identified in the Campaign Plan. The first step in the analysis of an enemy's operating system would be to identify its' component elements. Classifying the component elements of the target systems by mobility will allow us to focus on the Mobile Targets. (Figure 8- The fixed point targets can normally be attacked more effectively by Strike Aircraft, for the reasons explained in Chapter III. Due to the problems with physical security, the fixed linear targets are the traditional class of targets attacked by guerrillas.) Next the normal operation of the system and function of the component elements are analyzed using SOF Target Analysis Factors. (CARVER--Figure 7, page 17.) That analysis will allow an accurate estimate of the number of SOF missions required to debilitate the enemy operating system. After a series of enemy operating systems have been identified, analyzed for potential SO targeting using the approach described above, then the most effective SO targeting options would emerge. This would allow a rational prioritization of Targets and provide a menu of SO Targeting options for the Theater CINC.

This targeting process will, like the current Theater Target Board's approach, also produce more targets than we have SOF operational elements, but there are two important advantages to this approach. Although during the deliberate planning process the SOC would conduct analysis of numerous enemy battlefield operating systems, during execution SOF units would focus multiple attacks against the less visible elements of the enemy's battlefield systems. This will simplify the coordination between the Air Force units that

Components Elements of Target Systems

Component Elements \ Target System	Soviet Naval Aviation	Rail System	Petroleum Distribution System	Electric Distribution System
Mobile Targets	Bear Recon AC Backfire Bomber AC Refueling AC	Locomotives Freight Cars Tanker Cars Flat Bed Cars Track repair Cars	Tanker Trucks Tanker Ships Tanker Rail Cars Tactical Storage	Power Line Repair Crews
Fixed Point Targets	Primary Airfields Alternate Airfields Maintenance Facilities	Bridges Tunnels Switching Yards Repair Facilities	Refinery Long Term Storage	Dams Power Stations Transformers Switching Stations
Fixed Linear Targets	Strings of Navigation Becons	Rail line Rail Bed Electric Power lines	Pipelines	Power Lines

Figure 8

are conducting Air Interdiction Missions as part of the Theater Deep Battle, and SOF elements that will be conducting ground operations in the same area. Furthermore, the majority of these "targets" will be of a standardized type, such as a specific type of air unit, types of railroad cars (those which carry rail repair equipment), Petroleum Pipeline Units, or Ammuntion Storage Points, which means that a single "generic" Target Folder can address a series of targets. Although we may have hundreds of targets, we will need only a handful of Target Folders. This is a significant advantage not only from the SOC's planning prespective, but also from the SOF elements training perspective.

End Notes

1. Buel, Captain Larry V. "Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield." Military Review, LXVII, No. 10, October 1987

CHAPTER V

SO THEATER TARGETING PLANS

The targeting approach described in Chapter IV addresses targeting from a broader perspective that would allow an overall SO Targeting Plan, rather than the Theater Target Board's approach of identifying a series of individual targets. The menu of SO Targeting Options will become branches for the SO Targeting plan, providing the Theater CINC flexibility in employment of SOF assets. This is not to say that we can effectively engage all of the enemy operational systems that are identified or that we have analyzed. If we launch ten SOF elements against "critical nodes" of ten different enemy operating systems, the accomplishment of their individual missions may well be unnoticable from a theater level perspective. Brilliant tactical successes do not necessarily equal operational impact. The SOC and SOF Senior Commanders' responsibility is to orchestrate the SO Targeting so that the SOF tactical successes will have an operational impact on the theater level campaign. Normally that will mean focusing a series of SOF elements against the critical nodes of a single enemy battlefield system, so that the cumulative impact of their missions will degrade the enemy's capability at the vital moment in support of the CINC's conventional military operations.

In addition to selecting the enemy operational systems to be targeted, Geography, and Execution timing are other variables that impact on the SOF Targeting Plan. When all of these variables are considered the two logical

options that present themselves are: (Figure 9, page 21a)

(1) SOF Campaign Targeting Plan- dedicate SOF assets to the branch of the Targeting Plan (enemy operating system) that will best support the Theater Campaign Plan. This is the preferred employment of SOF because it allows the deployed SOF the maximum opportunity for tactical surprise.

(2) SOF Major Operation Targeting Plan- focus SOF assets against a limited geographic area, against a multiple enemy operating systems to achieve a short term impact. Often the SOF attacks will have to be conducted as a coordinated attack, to support the Major Operation Time Table, and to achieve the tactical surprise necessary for their own mission accomplishment. (If a series of SOF attacks are run on a given night in relatively restricted geographical area, the probability of finding the necessary opening for an attack on the following night will be very low.)

An important advantage of this concept of SO targeting is that it will engage the abilities of the Commanders and staffs of SOF units. Since the SOC's focus is on the enemy's operational systems instead of specific points on the ground, the theater SOF units can be given wide lattitude in the execution of thei missions. Therefore the senior commanders and staffs of SOF units can play a much more active role in developing the detailed plans, freeing the SOC to concentrate on the issues that are critical to the campaign.

SOF Targeting Plans

Type Plan / Implication	SOF Campaign Targeting Plan	SOF Major Operation Targeting Plan
Planning	Developed in peace time to support the Theater Campaign Plan. Normally a series of the enemy's battlefield Operating Systems are Identified, analyzed and planned to provide Branches for the SOF Campaign Plan, and a SOF Target Data Base.	Will be developed in Wartime to support Major Operations as directed. Will use Data Base Developed by SOC in peace time planning.
Enemy Target System	Multiple Elements of a Single Target System	Elements of a Multiple Target Systems
Geography	Theater Wide Area	More restricted, limited to area of Enemy Systems that influence the Major Operation
Execution Timing	Dictacted by SOF Considerations: OD Availability Infil Means OD Tactical Surprise	Influenced by SOF Considerations and time table of Major Operation that it supports

Figure 9

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

It is the responsibility of the Special Operations Community to describe the capability of our forces to insure that they are used in the most effective manner in war time. Most of our SFODs will be committed to "High Risk Missions", and they are ready, willing, and able. However, using the existing Joint Targeting Process for Special Forces is inappropriate and has caused the Special Operations Community to compete with High Performance Aircraft for a class of targets that are unsuited to our capabilities. By addressing mobile target systems, that are not easily "seen" by aerial reconnaissance, Special Operating Forces can provide an alternate perspective on the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield in the Deliberate Planning Process and will complement, rather than compete with, our air power's capability in the execution of the Theater Deep Battle.

GLOSSARY

Part I. Acronyms

CARVER	Acronym used in Target Analysis by Special Forces. The letters stand for the following Criteria that are used to evaluate a possible target. **Criticality** to enemy operations **Accessability** to SOF element **Recouperability** how long to repair, replace or bypass **Vulnerability** to SOF weapons and tactics **Effect** at Strategic, operational and tactical levels, and on the local civilian populace. **Recognizability** target must be capable of being identified under various weather light and seasonal conditions.
CEP	Circular Error Probable
FLOT	Forward Line of Troops
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
ISE	Intelligence Support Element
JOPS	Joint Operational Planning System
MTP	Mission Tasking Packet
NCA	National Command Authority
PA	Preliminary Assessment
POE	Plan of Execution
SOC	Special Operations Command.

SOF	Special Operations Forces
SOIF	Special Operations Intelligence Folder
SOMPF	Special Operations Mission Planning Folder
TASOC	Theater Army Special Operations Command
UW	Unconventional Warfare

Part II. Definitions

Counterterrorism- offensive measure taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called CT. (JCS Pub 1)

Deep Reconnaisance- is intelligence collection activity conducted beyond the operational capabilities of tactical collections systems to (1) Obtain information about the activities and resources of a target, organization of group, or (2)Secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. (3) Verify intelligence data obtained by other means. (FM 31-20)

Direct Action Mission- In special operations, a pecified act involving operations of a overt, clandestine, or low viibility nature conducted primarily by special operations forces in hostile or denied areas. (FM 31-20)

Foreign Internal Defense- participation by civilian and military agencies of government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its' society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency (JCS Pub 1)

HF Radio High Frequency Radio- a family of long range radios used by Special Operating Forces

Special Operations- Operations conducted by specially trained, equipped, and organized DOD forces against strategic or tactical targets in prusuit of national military political, economic or psychological objectives. These operations may be conducted during periods of peace or hostilities. They may support conventional operations, or they may be prosecuted independently when the

use of conventional forces is either inappropriate or infeasible. (JCS Pub1)

Special Operations Command- the command that is directly subordinate to the theater CINC headquarters, and is responsible of the planning and control of Special Operations Forces employed in the theater. These commands are normally very small during peacetime (commanded by a BG, with approximately 20 Officers and NCOs assigned) and are often found acting as a subdivision of the CINC's Operations Staff.

Unconventional Warfare- a broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held, enemy-controlled or politically sensitive territory. Unconventional Warfare includes, but is not limited to, the interrelated fields of guerrilla warfare, evasion and escape, subversion, sabotage, and other operations of a low visibility, covert or clandestine nature. These interrelated aspects of unconventional warfare may be prosecuted singly or collectively by predominantly indigenous personnel, usually supported and directed in varying degrees by (an) external source (s) during all conditions of war or peace. (JCS Pub1)

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